Only the latest release on the default branch (main) is supported with security updates.

If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:

Email: security@sanna.dev

Please include:

• A description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce
• Potential impact
• Any suggested fixes (optional)

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Good-faith security researchers acting within this policy will not face legal action from Sanna AI. We consider security research conducted consistent with this policy to be authorized and will not pursue civil or criminal action.

The following repositories are in scope:

• sanna
• sanna-ts
• sanna-openclaw
• sanna-protocol

The Sanna Cloud service (api.sanna.cloud) is also in scope.

• Social engineering (e.g., phishing)
• Denial of service (DoS/DDoS) attacks
• Third-party services and dependencies

Our security.txt file is available at: https://sanna.dev/.well-known/security.txt

Researchers who report valid vulnerabilities will be credited (with their permission) in release notes.

The committed Ed25519 PEM private key formerly under tests/.test_keys/ (key_id c7065a8b70d9ad93611125691c762cedbef6c15e8f4fc25a86cabb4ceecbd3d8) has been rotated and is now REVOKED. The corresponding private key was committed to a public repository and must be assumed compromised.

Constitution YAMLs under tests/constitutions/ whose provenance.signature.key_id matches the value above were valid under the old key but MUST NOT be trusted as cryptographic evidence in any external context. They are re-signed with the new key in this release; if a downstream consumer holds an older copy of these fixtures, those copies should be discarded.

Forward-only removal: the old .key file has been deleted from the working tree but remains reachable in git history at the commit at which it was originally introduced. Sanna does not rewrite git history; the trust signal is the REVOKED note above plus the rotated .pub and re-signed YAMLs at HEAD.

Going forward, .pre-commit-config.yaml's detect-private-key hook blocks PEM private keys from entering the repo. CI runs the same hook on every pull request. The .gitignore line that previously un-ignored tests/.test_keys/*.key has been removed.

See also: the "Intentionally Public Test Cryptographic Material (SAN-489)" section below for fixed-seed test fixtures that are intentionally public by design and are NOT subject to this rotation. The two cases are distinct: SAN-404 covers a previously-committed PEM private key that was inadvertently exposed and has been REVOKED; SAN-489 covers test material that was always intentionally public and remains so.

The Ed25519 seed at tests/generate_vectors.py (INTENTIONALLY_PUBLIC_TEST_VECTOR_SEED = b"\x01" * 32, also referenced at tests/test_vectors.py) is intentionally public. The corresponding deterministic keypair (key_id 34750f98bd59fcfc946da45aaabe933be154a4b5094e1c4abf42866505f3c97e, public_key_hex 8a88e3dd7409f195fd52db2d3cba5d72ca6709bf1d94121bf3748801b40f6f5c) signs the cross-language test vectors at tests/vectors/constitution_signature.json and tests/vectors/receipt_signature.json.

This is NOT a leaked secret. It is a fixed-seed test fixture that enables third-party Sanna SDK implementations to reproduce signatures byte-for-byte for canonicalization + signing conformance. The pattern matches RFC 8032 test vectors and reference Ed25519 implementations.

This material MUST NOT be added to any production trust anchor. The key_id above is published only as a test artifact; any system that trusts it as a real publisher is misconfigured.

This SAN-489 section is distinct from the SAN-404 "Test Key Rotation" section above: SAN-404 covered a previously-committed PEM private key that was inadvertently exposed and has been ROTATED + REVOKED. SAN-489 covers a fixed-seed test fixture that is and remains intentionally public by design.