Impact
The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler — which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.
The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.
On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:
- The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (
.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)
- The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (
previewModeId, previewModeSigningKey, previewModeEncryptionKey)
- Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
- Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux
uploadId, assetId, playbackId values stored in videos/*.json)
Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.
Patches
2.8.1
Workarounds
Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:
- Reject any
url value that does not begin with https://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.
- Alternatively, remove the
/api/video route entirely if your application only uses build-time import of local video files and does not use <Video src="https://..."> with string URLs at runtime.
References
src/request-handler.ts — the vulnerable GET handler
src/assets.ts — getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurs
src/utils/utils.ts — isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branches
src/config.ts — loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrained fs.readFile
References
Impact
The HTTP route handler exported by
next-video/request-handler— which the README instructs consumers to mount at/api/video— allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary.jsonfiles from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.The handler's
GETendpoint accepts aurlquery parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path,.jsonis appended, and the file is read withfs.readFileand returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:
.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)previewModeId,previewModeSigningKey,previewModeEncryptionKey)uploadId,assetId,playbackIdvalues stored invideos/*.json)Any application that mounted
/api/videofollowing the documented one-liner is affected.Patches
2.8.1
Workarounds
Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the
urlparameter before passing it through:urlvalue that does not begin withhttps://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts./api/videoroute entirely if your application only uses build-timeimportof local video files and does not use<Video src="https://...">with string URLs at runtime.References
src/request-handler.ts— the vulnerable GET handlersrc/assets.ts—getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurssrc/utils/utils.ts—isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branchessrc/config.ts—loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrainedfs.readFileReferences