What would you like to be added:
Implement OCI artifact signature verification in the artifact-operator's OCI puller. After pulling an artifact and before extracting it, the operator should verify the artifact's signature to ensure integrity and authenticity.
falcoctl already supports signature verification during both artifact install and artifact follow. The operator's OCI puller (internal/pkg/oci/puller/puller.go) currently skips this step entirely.
The feature could be controlled via:
- A CRD field (e.g.,
ociArtifact.verifySignature: true)
- A global operator flag (e.g.,
--verify-signatures)
- Or enabled by default with an opt-out (e.g.,
ociArtifact.noVerify: true)
Why is this needed:
- Supply chain security: without signature verification, a compromised registry or man-in-the-middle attack could inject malicious rules or plugin binaries that Falco would load and execute.
- Feature parity with falcoctl: falcoctl verifies signatures by default and provides
--no-verify as an explicit opt-out.
- Trust boundary: Falco plugins are native shared libraries (
.so) loaded into the Falco process. Unsigned plugin installation is a significant attack surface.
What would you like to be added:
Implement OCI artifact signature verification in the artifact-operator's OCI puller. After pulling an artifact and before extracting it, the operator should verify the artifact's signature to ensure integrity and authenticity.
falcoctlalready supports signature verification during bothartifact installandartifact follow. The operator's OCI puller (internal/pkg/oci/puller/puller.go) currently skips this step entirely.The feature could be controlled via:
ociArtifact.verifySignature: true)--verify-signatures)ociArtifact.noVerify: true)Why is this needed:
--no-verifyas an explicit opt-out..so) loaded into the Falco process. Unsigned plugin installation is a significant attack surface.