According to https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/API_Decrypt.html#KMS-Decrypt-request-Recipient, the only supported algorithm of the public key used to encrypt KMS response is RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256, which is prone to quantum attack
Given post-quantum encryption is more and more critical now, any plan to support it?
Also, the most common post-quantum algorithm out there is MLKEM768. And its public key size is 1184 bytes, so the public_key field of the attestation document, which is 1024-byte long, is definitely not enough
According to https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/API_Decrypt.html#KMS-Decrypt-request-Recipient, the only supported algorithm of the public key used to encrypt KMS response is
RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256, which is prone to quantum attackGiven post-quantum encryption is more and more critical now, any plan to support it?
Also, the most common post-quantum algorithm out there is
MLKEM768. And its public key size is 1184 bytes, so thepublic_keyfield of the attestation document, which is 1024-byte long, is definitely not enough