Use consistent terminology for BLP model.

Signed-off-by: Sam Williams <sam@badcow.co>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <Daniel.Burgener@microsoft.com>

Author: Sam Williams

src/mac.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The [**Type Enforcement (TE)**](type_enforcement.md#type-enforcement) and
 covers these in more detail.
 
 **Multi-Level Security** - This is an implementation based on the
-Bell-La Padula (BLP) model, and used by organizations where different
+Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model, and used by organizations where different
 levels of access are required so that restricted information is
 separated from classified information to maintain confidentiality. This
 allows enforcement rules such as 'no write down' and 'no read up' to be

src/mls_mcs.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ context. This section gives a brief introduction to MLS and MCS.
 **Figure 8: Security Levels and Data Flows** shows a simple diagram where
 security levels represent the classification of files within a file server.
 The security levels are strictly hierarchical and conform to the
-[*Bell-La & Padula model*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell-LaPadula_model)
+[*Bell-LaPadula model*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell-LaPadula_model)
 (BLP) in that (in the case of SELinux) a process (running at the
 'Confidential' level) can read / write at their current level but only read
 down levels or write up levels (the assumption here is that the process is

src/terminology.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Access Vector Cache
 
 **BLP**
 
-Bell-La Padula
+Bell-LaPadula
 
 **CC**
 
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ conforms to a **Policy**. Examples of policy based MAC are **SELinux** and SMACK
 
 **Multi-Level Security (MLS)**
 
-Based on the Bell-La & Padula model (BLP) for confidentiality in that
+Based on the Bell & LaPadula model (BLP) for confidentiality in that
 (for example) a process running at a 'Confidential' level can read / write at
 their current level but only read down levels or write up levels. While still
 used in this way, it is more commonly used for application separation