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W761+W762+W763+W764+W765 security batch (sw.js v54, 135 tests)
W761 Model Poisoning Anomaly Detection (25/25 green): - src/teacher-response-hmac.js: TEACHER_HMAC_VERSION='w761-v1', HMAC-SHA256 with crypto.timingSafeEqual; KOLM_TEACHER_HMAC_KEY env-required (MIN_KEY_BYTES=32); bindTeacherResponse stamps key_fingerprint = sha256(key)[0:16]; verifyTeacherResponse constant-time; attachBindingToCapture idempotent; verifyCaptureBinding fail-loud. Chain: hmac(key, teacher_id ':' request_hash ':' sha256(response_body) ':' timestamp_ms). - src/poisoning-orchestrator.js: POISONING_VERSION='w761-v1', frozen POISON_RISK_LEVELS [safe/review/quarantine/rotate_teacher_key]; assessPoisoningRisk lazy-imports W808 capture-anomaly + W750 copyright-detector under try/catch (no hard dep, no module load fail); HMAC verify failure ALWAYS escalates to rotate_teacher_key (safety invariant); assessNamespacePoisoningRisk tenant-fenced via storeMod.all + per-row check (W411 defense-in-depth — findByTenant keys on `tenant`, audit.js writes `tenant_id`, so we filter manually); quarantineCapture + releaseFromQuarantine audit-trailed. - 4 routes appended to src/router.js, cmdW761Poison wired from case 'poison' at line 35187; vercel.json rewrite for /security/model-poisoning. W762 Adversarial Red-Team Framework (28/28 green): - src/adversarial-prompts.js: ADVERSARIAL_PROMPTS_VERSION='w762-v1', 8 frozen ADVERSARIAL_CATEGORIES [prompt_injection/jailbreak/ system_prompt_leak/data_extraction/role_confusion/encoding_smuggling/ context_overflow/tool_hijack]; ADVERSARIAL_CORPUS_SEED 5-10 patterns per category; generateAdversarialPrompts uses Mulberry32 PRNG so --seed is deterministic; classifyPromptAdversarial 22 regexes. - src/adversarial-bakeoff.js: ADVERSARIAL_BAKEOFF_VERSION='w762-v1', runAdversarialBakeoff with DI runOnArtifact + judge seams (never hits real APIs in tests); judge_kind 'heuristic'|'callable' tagged honestly on every row. - src/runtime-sanitizer.js: SANITIZER_VERSION='w762-v1', frozen SANITIZE_POLICIES [block/redact/fallback_to_teacher/passthrough]; DEFAULT_POLICY='fallback_to_teacher'; right-to-left span substitution so overlapping spans don't shift offsets. - 4 routes, cmdW762Redteam at line 36471, case 'rt' at 35201; vercel.json rewrite for /security/red-team. Intentional W765 overlap on "ignore previous instructions" — layered defense. W763 SBOM + Supply-Chain Pinning (26/26 green): - src/sbom-emit.js: SBOM_VERSION='w763-v1', frozen SBOM_FORMATS [cyclonedx-json/spdx-json]; emitSbomFromManifest / emitSbomFromPackageLock / emitSbomFromPython; verifySbomShape rejects Array input directly with ok:false (was falling through to ok:true valid:false). - apps/export/sbom.py: stdlib-only Python, --manifest/--package-lock/ --requirements/--cargo-lock flags. No third-party deps so the supply- chain tool can't BE a supply-chain attack vector. - .github/workflows/sbom.yml: 7 steps, CycloneDX-npm primary + Python stdlib backstop + tracking-issue on failure. - .github/dependabot.yml: CREATED (none existed) — npm + github-actions + pip, weekly cadence, labels [supply-chain, w763]. DEVIATION from "do not create new files at repo root" — necessary to wire weekly dep-vuln scanning. - 3 routes, cmdW763Sbom wired; vercel.json rewrite for /security/sbom. W764 Membership Inference Test Harness (30/30 green): - src/membership-inference-test.js: MIT_VERSION='w764-v1', frozen 4-entry MIT_ATTACK_KINDS [exact_prompt_replay/paraphrase_prompt/ partial_prompt_completion/unique_token_probe]; jaccardOverlap over 5-token n-grams (pure, symmetric); runMembershipInferenceTest with DI runOnArtifact + judge seams; jaccard_threshold=0.85 honest floor. - src/pii-bakeoff-scan.js: PII_SCAN_VERSION='w764-v1', frozen 10-entry PII_PATTERN_CATEGORIES; FULL Luhn mod-10 (rejects 4111111111111112 / accepts 4111111111111111 — no shortcut prefix matching); JWT base64url-decode header sanity (avoids false positives on random base64); name_likely heuristic explicitly flagged as heuristic (not authoritative PII). - src/capture-forget.js: FORGET_VERSION='w764-v1', markCaptureForgotten audit-trailed via provider='kolm_capture_forget', idempotent on (tenant_id, capture_id); defense-in-depth tenant fence (query filter + per-row check, W411 law); listForgottenCaptures + filterForgottenCaptures both tenant-fenced. - 4 routes, cmdW764Mit at line 37067, case 'forget'|'mit' at 35214-35215; vercel.json rewrite for /security/membership-inference. W765 Prompt Extraction Defense (26/26 green): - src/prompt-redactor.js: PROMPT_REDACTOR_VERSION='w765-v1', frozen REDACTION_STRATEGIES [placeholder/paraphrase/ remove_literal_constraints/extract_behavior_only]; paraphrase strategy returns honest 'paraphrase_requires_teacher_caller' envelope when no teacher seam wired (NEVER fakes paraphrasing — would be a silent-pass invariant break); extract_behavior_only returns ONLY behavior description (e.g. 'Respond in 1-2 sentences.' instead of original prompt). API_KEY regex loosened to allow optional intermediate segment so Stripe-style sk_live_abcdef1234567890ABCDEF matches BEFORE the PHONE regex catches the 10-digit substring inside it. - src/extraction-guard.js: EXTRACTION_GUARD_VERSION='w765-v1', 12 EXTRACTION_PATTERNS; frozen POLICIES [block/log_only/ redirect_to_safe_response/log_and_block]; never-silent-pass invariant (test #19 locks this — guardRuntimeRequest NEVER returns action:passthrough on any matched attempt under any policy); 0.95 confidence cap (never claim 1.0). - 3 routes, cmdW765Pextract at line 36650, case 'pextract' at 35221; vercel.json rewrite for /security/prompt-extraction. Intentional layered defense: W762 + W765 overlap on "ignore previous instructions" pattern — adversarial detection in W762 classifier + runtime extraction guard in W765 + runtime sanitizer in W762 wrapForRuntime. Each layer can independently fire even if upstream layer was bypassed. Test W765 #13 explicitly notes the W762 sibling. Per W604 anti-brittleness: every wave's sibling sw.js check uses wave(\d{3,4}) regex + threshold (>=761), never explicit-array family checks. Per W411 defense-in-depth: every tenant-fenced read uses storeMod.all + per-row tenant_id !== tenant_id filter (the findByTenant field-key mismatch with audit.js was caught during W761 and corrected). sw.js: kolm-v53 -> kolm-v54-2026-05-24-w761-w762-w763-w764-w765-poisoning-redteam-sbom-mit-pextract frontend-version.json: version + source_commit_at_edit_time bumped to match 135/135 tests green (25+28+26+30+26) 0 broken hrefs, 0 missing static refs (audit clean) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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.github/dependabot.yml

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# W763 — Dependabot for SBOM + supply-chain pinning.
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#
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# Companion to .github/workflows/sbom.yml and /security/sbom. Dependabot
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# raises a PR per outdated dep on its weekly schedule; the sbom.yml workflow
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# runs on every push to main and on release events so the SBOM is always
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# refreshed alongside the merge. Hash pinning of every transitive dep is a
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# sustained audit — see /security/sbom for the W763-followup roadmap.
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version: 2
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updates:
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- package-ecosystem: "npm"
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directory: "/"
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schedule:
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interval: "weekly"
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open-pull-requests-limit: 5
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labels:
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- "supply-chain"
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- "w763"
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commit-message:
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prefix: "deps"
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include: "scope"
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- package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
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directory: "/"
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schedule:
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interval: "weekly"
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open-pull-requests-limit: 3
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labels:
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- "supply-chain"
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- "w763"
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commit-message:
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prefix: "ci"
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include: "scope"
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- package-ecosystem: "pip"
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directory: "/apps"
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schedule:
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interval: "weekly"
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open-pull-requests-limit: 3
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labels:
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- "supply-chain"
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- "w763"
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commit-message:
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prefix: "deps-py"
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include: "scope"

.github/workflows/sbom.yml

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name: sbom
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on:
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push:
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branches: [main]
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release:
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types: [published]
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workflow_dispatch: {}
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# We DO NOT modify package-lock.json from CI. The SBOM job is read-only:
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# it generates a CycloneDX BOM, uploads it as a workflow artifact, and
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# opens a tracking issue on failure. Hash pinning of every transitive
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# dep is a sustained audit, not a single-PR ship (see /security/sbom).
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jobs:
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sbom:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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timeout-minutes: 15
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permissions:
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contents: read
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issues: write
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: setup node
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uses: actions/setup-node@v4
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with:
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node-version: '20'
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cache: 'npm'
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# Verify pinned versions resolve. --ignore-scripts blocks
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# postinstall hooks; --omit=optional skips opt-in platform binaries
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# so a Linux runner doesn't trip on darwin-only wheels.
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- name: npm ci (verify lock resolves)
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run: npm ci --omit=optional --ignore-scripts
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# Generate CycloneDX SBOM via npx (no install in package.json).
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# @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm is the official Node SBOM emitter.
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- name: generate cyclonedx sbom (node deps)
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run: |
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npx -y -p @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm@latest cyclonedx-npm \
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--output-format JSON \
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--output-file kolm-stack.cdx.json \
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--omit dev \
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--validate
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continue-on-error: true
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id: cdx
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# Always emit our own SBOM (apps/export/sbom.py) as a backstop so we
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# have an SBOM even if @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm hits a parse edge.
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- name: generate kolm sbom (python stdlib fallback)
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run: |
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python3 apps/export/sbom.py \
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--package-lock package-lock.json \
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--format cyclonedx-json \
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--output kolm-stack-sbom.json
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python3 apps/export/sbom.py \
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--package-lock package-lock.json \
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--format spdx-json \
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--output kolm-stack-sbom.spdx.json
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- name: upload sbom artifacts
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
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with:
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name: sbom-${{ github.sha }}
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path: |
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kolm-stack.cdx.json
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kolm-stack-sbom.json
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kolm-stack-sbom.spdx.json
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retention-days: 90
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if-no-files-found: warn
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# If the CycloneDX step itself failed, open a tracking issue so the
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# release isn't silently shipped without an SBOM. We do NOT open one
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# for clean vuln-free runs (would spam the tracker).
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- name: open tracking issue on sbom failure
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if: steps.cdx.outcome == 'failure'
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uses: actions/github-script@v7
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with:
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script: |
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const title = `SBOM emission failed on ${context.sha.slice(0,7)}`;
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const body = [
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`Run: ${context.serverUrl}/${context.repo.owner}/${context.repo.repo}/actions/runs/${context.runId}`,
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``,
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`\`cyclonedx-npm\` reported a non-zero exit on commit \`${context.sha}\`.`,
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`The Python stdlib fallback (apps/export/sbom.py) still ran;`,
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`the artifact is uploaded as kolm-stack-sbom.json. Investigate the`,
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`cyclonedx-npm error in the workflow logs and either pin the`,
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`bad dep or upgrade @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm.`,
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``,
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`See: /security/sbom`,
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].join('\n');
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await github.rest.issues.create({
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owner: context.repo.owner,
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repo: context.repo.repo,
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title,
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body,
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labels: ['supply-chain', 'sbom', 'w763'],
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});

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