Skip to content

BYPASS_CATALOG.md

Latest commit

 

History

History
42 lines (34 loc) · 1.81 KB

BYPASS_CATALOG.md

File metadata and controls

42 lines (34 loc) · 1.81 KB
Raw

AegisBPF Bypass Catalog

Version: 1.0 (2026-02-05) Status: Canonical bypass catalog for the v1 contract.

This catalog records known bypass surfaces and their disposition. Each entry is classified as accepted, mitigated, or roadmap to keep claims defensible.

Accepted (out of scope for v1)

  • Root compromise / kernel compromise
    • Out of scope by threat model. Kernel modules or root can bypass policy.
  • Non-LSM enforcement paths when BPF LSM is unavailable
    • Tracepoint fallback is audit-only; syscall deny is not possible.
  • Privileged container escape with host-level capabilities
    • Treated as root-equivalent in scope definition.

Mitigated (explicitly handled)

  • Symlink swaps
    • Canonical path resolution + inode-based enforcement.
    • Evidence: docs/EDGE_CASE_COMPLIANCE_SUITE.md (symlink swap scenarios).
  • Rename / hardlink path drift
    • Inode-based deny persists across renames and hardlinks.
    • Evidence: docs/EDGE_CASE_COMPLIANCE_SUITE.md (rename + hardlink scenarios).
  • Bind-mount aliases
    • Enforcement is inode-driven; path telemetry can differ by namespace.
    • Evidence: docs/EDGE_CASE_COMPLIANCE_SUITE.md (bind‑mount alias scenarios).
  • Outbound message sends (sendmsg)
    • Covered by the same remote endpoint deny semantics as connect() when the kernel exposes socket_sendmsg.
    • Evidence: docs/NETWORK_LAYER_DESIGN.md, docs/POLICY_SEMANTICS.md.

Roadmap (planned mitigation or coverage expansion)

  • Pre-accept inbound policy coverage
    • Add earlier inbound filtering or richer hook coverage before accept() returns the socket to user space.
  • Broader filesystem matrix
    • Extend validation beyond ext4/xfs to additional FS types.
  • Namespace-specific path views
    • Improve operator tooling to reconcile path differences across namespaces.